🟡 [U.S. Preliminary Decision on Korean Wire Rod: 0.51% Dumping Margin Assigned to POSCO]

📅 Date: August 4, 2025 (EST)

✍️ Issued by: U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)

🧾 Summary (Non-Simplified)

On August 4, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) announced the preliminary results of its 7th administrative review of antidumping duties on carbon and alloy steel wire rod imported from South Korea. The review period covered sales made between May 1, 2023, and April 30, 2024.

The DOC concluded that Korean producers sold the merchandise in the U.S. at prices below the normal value. As a result, it assigned a preliminary dumping margin of 0.51% to POSCO and POSCO International Corporation.

The product under investigation—carbon and alloy steel wire rod—is used in manufacturing nails, wire mesh, springs, and wire ropes. It falls under a wide range of HTS codes (e.g., 7213.91.xxxx, 7227.20.xxxx, 7227.90.xxxx).

🧩 Case Background

The original antidumping petition was filed on March 28, 2017, by a coalition of U.S. steel producers, including Nucor Corporation, Gerdau Ameristeel, Keystone Consolidated Industries, and Charter Steel. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a positive injury determination in May 2017, enabling the DOC to impose duties.

Since then, the case has undergone multiple rounds of administrative and sunset reviews. In 2018, POSCO was assigned a final margin of 41.10%, which has gradually decreased over time. Several scope change reviews led to the exclusion of specific high-grade products (e.g., tire cord and valve spring quality rods) from duties.

The current 7th administrative review marks a continuation of enforcement under the antidumping order, with a newly assessed margin of 0.51%. While significantly lower than in earlier years, it still reflects DOC’s commitment to maintaining trade remedies.

As U.S. trade policy tightens and the global value chain decouples from China, POSCO—South Korea’s industrial cornerstone—is undergoing a silent but profound transformation. Once emblematic of commodity-scale steel exports, POSCO is now repositioning itself as a tech-aligned, resource-integrated, geopolitically distributed actor in the clean industrial age.

🌐 Geographic Shift: From China to Strategic Ally Zones

In July 2025, POSCO finalized the sale of its majority stake in the Zhangjiagang stainless steel joint venture in China. This marked more than a financial exit—it was a structural pivot. At the same time, POSCO has rapidly deepened its U.S. footprint:

• A planned equity stake in Hyundai Steel’s $5.8B integrated steel plant in Louisiana, set to supply EV-grade steel by 2029

• A pilot lithium brine extraction facility in Utah, leveraging its proprietary DLE (Direct Lithium Extraction) technology

• A joint rare earths processing venture with Energy Fuels in Colorado, establishing a non-China NdPr oxide supply chain

• A feasibility study with CF Industries for U.S.-produced clean ammonia and hydrogen

These moves position POSCO not merely as a supplier but as a node in the U.S. clean tech and national security value chain.

🧪 Material Shift: From Mass Steel to Strategic Elements

This is not geographic hedging alone—it is material evolution. POSCO is stepping into global bottlenecks:

• Lithium, nickel, and battery precursors for EVs

• Rare earth magnets for drivetrains

• Green hydrogen and ammonia for industrial decarbonization

• High-purity, tariff-resilient steel alloys for next-gen mobility

It is, in essence, constructing an anti-fragile supply architecture across critical materials.

📊 Strategic Implication: POSCO as a Platform, Not a Manufacturer

BBIU identifies this transformation as a paradigm shift:
From a centralized steelmaker to a decentralized infrastructure platform supporting U.S. and allied resilience initiatives.

This includes:

• Localized production to neutralize tariff exposure

• Technology licensing models (e.g., DLE)

• Joint-venture-based integration into critical U.S. industries

POSCO is no longer just "exporting steel"; it is embedding itself into sovereign industrial planning.

🧩 BBIU Perspective

What we are witnessing is a realignment that matches:

• The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)

• Decoupling from Chinese strategic control

• South Korea’s need to defend its industrial leverage via integration—not confrontation

POSCO’s moves are pre-emptive and symbolic: the closure of legacy units in Pohang is not decline—it is symbolic pruning before transnational grafting.

Conclusion:
POSCO is not retreating. It is migrating, specializing, and reattaching to the emergent industrial superstructure.
It now functions as a resource enabler, not just a steel producer.

This is not a diversification. It is a metamorphosis.