Argentina’s 2025 Midterm Elections: A New Balance of Power in Congress
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Executive Summary
The 2025 Argentine legislative elections marked a decisive reshaping of the political landscape. La Libertad Avanza (LLA) consolidated its position as the country’s leading force, surpassing 40% of the national vote. Its gains were particularly evident in Buenos Aires Province, where it edged Fuerza Patria by a narrow margin. The results produced a realignment in the Chamber of Deputies: LLA emerges as the dominant bloc, but still without an absolute majority, while traditional parties face fragmentation and regional erosion.
Key References
Dirección Nacional Electoral – Resultados provisorios oficiales (2025).
La Nación – “Así quedó la Cámara de Diputados: uno por uno, ganadores y perdedores de las elecciones 2025” (Oct 26, 2025).
Infobae – “Elecciones legislativas 2025: resultados nacionales” (Oct 26, 2025).
Página/12 – “Participación electoral superó niveles de 2021” (Oct 26, 2025).
Chequeado – “Claves del triunfo nacional de La Libertad Avanza” (Oct 27, 2025).
Five Laws of Epistemic Integrity
1. Truthfulness of Information — High
The data are sourced from the Dirección Nacional Electoral and leading Argentine media outlets, ensuring factual reliability on vote percentages and seat allocation.
2. Source Referencing — High
Cross-verification with government platforms and independent outlets provides redundancy and minimizes bias.
3. Reliability & Accuracy — Moderate to High
While official tallies are still provisional, consistency across multiple outlets supports accuracy. Final adjustments are expected but not structurally transformative.
4. Contextual Judgment — Moderate
The election results cannot be read in isolation: they intersect with Argentina’s economic crisis, IMF negotiations, and Trump’s hemispheric trade agenda. Political fragmentation remains a decisive structural factor.
5. Inference Traceability — High
The seat distribution and voting patterns allow traceable inferences on legislative behavior, coalition-building prospects, and policy bottlenecks.
Structured BBIU Opinion
1. Political Layer
LLA’s consolidation symbolizes a voter shift toward economic liberalization, anti-establishment rhetoric, and direct alignment with U.S. policy frameworks. However, its lack of absolute majority ensures a fragile governance scenario, where every reform will demand negotiated alliances.
2. Economic Layer
The results coincide with Argentina’s critical fiscal dependence on IMF facilities. A fragmented Congress complicates structural reforms, especially in taxation, subsidies, and debt servicing. The opposition’s residual strength implies persistent veto power against austerity or deregulation measures.
3. Symbolic Layer
The 2025 midterms transcend numbers: they mark the institutionalization of LLA as a central actor of the Argentine system. Symbolically, Peronism loses its historic monopoly over Buenos Aires Province, a rupture with decades of electoral tradition. This erosion signals a broader collapse of legacy political identities in favor of fluid, populist blocs.
4. Systemic Risks
The absence of a governing majority raises the risk of legislative paralysis. Markets may perceive the results as either stabilization (due to LLA’s ascendancy) or heightened volatility (due to the lack of governability). The interaction between Congressional fragmentation and Argentina’s economic fragility remains the key structural risk vector.
Annex 1 — Provincial vs. National Elections, and the New Balance of Power in Congress (Argentina 2025)
1. Provincial Outcomes: A Weak Territorial Footprint for LLA
The provincial elections of 2025 exposed the structural vulnerability of La Libertad Avanza (LLA).
In most provinces, entrenched officialisms (Peronist in the North, Radical/JxC in the Center-West) retained control of legislatures and governorships.
LLA failed to secure governorships or significant influence in provincial legislatures, underscoring its lack of territorial machinery.
The prevailing interpretation in October was that LLA’s expansion had peaked: without governors, mayors, or provincial bases, Milei’s movement appeared structurally fragile and politically isolated.
Resulting Forecast: Analysts warned of limited governability for Milei, anticipating legislative blockades and chronic dependency on provincial power brokers.
2. National Legislative Elections: A Surprising Recovery
Contrary to the pessimistic provincial forecast, the national midterms reversed the narrative.
LLA captured over 40% of the vote, outperforming Fuerza Patria by narrow margins in Buenos Aires and prevailing in key urban districts (Córdoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe).
The victory established LLA as the largest single bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, effectively consolidating its role as Argentina’s new axis of political competition.
However, the structural gap remained: LLA’s national vote share was not matched by local institutional penetration.
3. New Congressional Composition (from December 2025)
Chamber of Deputies (257 total seats):
La Libertad Avanza (LLA): 112 seats
Fuerza Patria (Kirchnerist coalition): 104 seats
Juntos por el Cambio (UCR/PRO): 32 seats
Provincial/Minor parties: 9 seats
Senate:
Opposition weakened after partial renewal. Kirchnerism lost ground, reducing its capacity to act as a unified counterweight.
Implications:
No bloc holds the 129 votes required for a simple majority in Deputies.
Provincial caucuses and independents hold decisive “swing” power.
In the Senate, two-thirds thresholds required for impeachment are numerically unattainable for the opposition.
4. Risk of Impeachment: Symbolic, Not Structural
Kirchnerism can threaten but cannot execute a removal of President Milei: two-thirds are far beyond its reach in both chambers.
The Senate’s weakened opposition further reduces feasibility.
The real risk is not formal destitution, but political erosion through legislative paralysis, mobilizations, and narrative pressure.
Annex 2 — Sequential Reform Roadmap After the Congressional Renewal (Argentina 2025–2026)
Introduction
The 2025 midterm elections have reconfigured Argentina’s Congress in a way that forces the Milei administration to confront a paradox: it has emerged as the largest single force in the Chamber of Deputies, but it lacks an outright majority. La Libertad Avanza (LLA) now controls 112 seats, short of the 129 needed for simple majority. With Kirchnerism holding 104, Juntos por el Cambio (UCR/PRO) reduced to 32, and provincial/independent parties retaining 9 seats, every significant reform will demand coalition-building.
Against this backdrop, Argentina’s chronic macroeconomic imbalances cannot be postponed. The new Congress, seated in December, will face a sequence of structural reforms that define whether the administration can transform electoral capital into a sustainable governing project. Below is the roadmap of necessary reforms, why they matter, what outcomes can be expected, the vote thresholds required, and whether alliances are indispensable.
1. Tax Reform (Reforma Tributaria)
What it is: A structural simplification of Argentina’s tax system. This involves reducing distortionary levies such as turnover taxes (Ingresos Brutos) and export withholdings, while broadening the base and increasing compliance.
Why it matters: The Argentine economy suffers from one of the highest effective tax burdens in Latin America, creating incentives for informality and deterring both domestic and foreign investment. A fragmented tax system discourages scale and capital inflows.
Expected outcome: Increased formalization, improved fiscal efficiency, and higher net revenue without raising nominal tax rates. This would also signal international investors that Argentina is committed to predictability.
Votes required: 129 in the Chamber of Deputies (simple majority) and 37 in the Senate.
Negotiation: LLA cannot pass this alone. It will need the 32 Juntos por el Cambio deputies and at least a portion of the provincial bloc. The reform could serve as a low-hanging fruit since it resonates with pro-market sectors.
2. Pension Reform (Reforma Previsional)
What it is: Adjustments to retirement age, changes to the mobility indexation formula, and gradual inclusion of informal workers into the contributory base.
Why it matters: Nearly 40% of Argentina’s primary expenditure is absorbed by pensions, creating a structural fiscal deficit. Without reform, long-term solvency is impossible, and IMF conditionality will remain unfulfilled.
Expected outcome: Reduction of the structural deficit, long-term sustainability of the pension system, and enhanced credibility with external lenders. However, this reform carries significant social and political costs.
Votes required: 129 in Deputies and 37 in the Senate.
Negotiation: This will require a grand coalition. Juntos por el Cambio’s cooperation is essential, alongside selective provincial governors. Street protests and union resistance are inevitable.
3. Subsidy Reform (Energy and Transport)
What it is: A progressive elimination of subsidies concentrated in Buenos Aires and rationalization of tariffs across the country.
Why it matters: Subsidies consume over 2% of GDP and disproportionately benefit middle- and upper-class households in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, at the expense of fiscal balance and provincial equity.
Expected outcome: Significant fiscal savings, more rational allocation of resources, and a rebalanced system favoring interior provinces. The reform would also unlock foreign investment in energy, particularly LNG and renewables.
Votes required: Embedded in the annual budget, hence requires a simple majority (129 + 37).
Negotiation: This will hinge on provincial governors. If subsidies are cut in Buenos Aires but redirected to provinces, it may gain traction. Kirchnerism will resist heavily due to electoral stakes in AMBA.
4. Labor Reform (Reforma Laboral)
What it is: Liberalization of hiring and dismissal, introduction of new flexible contracts, reduction of litigation risks, and reforms to union monopolies.
Why it matters: Argentina has not generated net formal private-sector jobs for over a decade. More than 40% of the labor force works informally. Labor rigidity has become one of the central deterrents for industrial investment.
Expected outcome: Job creation in labor-intensive sectors, gradual formalization of informal employment, and improved competitiveness.
Votes required: 129 + 37 (ordinary law).
Negotiation: This is the most contentious reform. Strong opposition from unions and Kirchnerism is guaranteed. It will require the united backing of Juntos por el Cambio plus sustained provincial support. Public opinion pressure will be decisive.
5. Judicial and Legal Security Reform
What it is: Strengthening of commercial courts, respect for international arbitration (ICSID), acceleration of judicial timelines, and establishment of a “single window” for investment-related permits.
Why it matters: Argentina’s reputation for regulatory unpredictability and legal delays is a central reason foreign investors avoid large-scale commitments. Without legal certainty, no tax or labor reform can secure capital inflows.
Expected outcome: Reduction in the “Argentina risk premium,” re-engagement with foreign investors in energy, mining, and biopharma, and fewer international disputes.
Votes required: Simple majority.
Negotiation: This reform may face less resistance, as many governors would support a more reliable legal environment to attract projects in their provinces.
6. Foreign Exchange and Investment Regime Reform
What it is: Gradual dismantling of the foreign exchange controls (cepo), legal guarantees for dividend repatriation, and introduction of a 10-year fiscal and exchange-rate stability law for large-scale investments.
Why it matters: Capital controls and currency duality are the single most prohibitive factors for multinational corporations. Without certainty on repatriation of profits, investment will remain speculative and short-term.
Expected outcome: Restoration of investor confidence, large-scale capital inflows into strategic projects (energy, lithium, agribusiness), and a gradual strengthening of central bank reserves.
Votes required: 129 + 37.
Negotiation: Negotiations with governors from mining and energy provinces (Cuyo, Patagonia, Northwest) will be critical. Kirchnerism will oppose on ideological grounds, but provincial interests may override.
Structural Outlook
Optimal sequencing:
Tax Reform — quickest to legislate, sends a confidence signal.
Subsidy Reform — creates immediate fiscal relief, less technically complex.
Pension Reform — high-impact, high-cost, but necessary for IMF credibility.
Labor Reform — politically explosive, should be attempted last with public opinion leverage.
Judicial and FX Reforms — to be advanced in parallel, as they are the essential magnets for foreign investment.
Political reality: LLA cannot govern through legislation alone. Every reform requires alliances, either with Juntos por el Cambio or with provincial blocs. Negotiation, not unilateralism, is the architecture of Milei’s governability.
Risk: The greatest obstacle lies not in Congress alone but in the streets. Trade unions, social movements, and Kirchnerism can mobilize to block reforms. Success depends on sequencing reforms carefully and securing early victories that create political momentum.
BBIU Conclusion
The post-December reform cycle will determine Argentina’s trajectory for the next decade. Tax, pension, labor, subsidy, judicial, and foreign exchange reforms form the six pillars of a coherent strategy. Each requires different negotiations, distinct coalitions, and calibrated sequencing. Failure to advance within the first year will deepen perceptions of ungovernability and accelerate capital flight. Conversely, success in even two or three of these reforms could reposition Argentina as a credible destination for global investment.
